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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Russell Passons appeals from a judgment of conviction upon a jury's
guilty verdict on two counts of aggravated assault and one count of burglary.
Passons challenges the district court's ruling allowing evidence of events from
the day after the crimes were committed, which led to Passons' arrest for those
crimes.

Passons also challenges the district court's denial of his motions for

mistrial due to a prospective juror's statement about Passons' tattoos during voir
dire, and a witness's statement at trial to which defense counsel objected and for
which the district court promptly gave a curative instruction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Passons

walked

into

a

Walmart

in

Post

Falls,

Idaho,

took

a

carseat/stroller (hereafter "stroller") off the shelf, then left the store without paying
for it and loaded it into his car. (Tr., p. 161, Ls. 16-23; p. 178, Ls. 14-24.) In
digital video recordings taken by Walmart cameras, Passons can be seen
loading the stroller into his gold Oldsmobile Intrigue. (Tr., p. 163, Ls. 4-18; p.
176, Ls. 4-6; p. 184, Ls. 3-9.) Passons then re-entered the store, loaded a 37inch flat-screen television into a cart and again started to leave without paying.
(Tr., p. 165, L.10-p.167, L. 24; p.178, L. 24-p.179, L. 2.) This time, he was
approached by two Walmart employees. (Tr., p. 168, Ls. 20-24.)
When the employees identified themselves, Passons stepped to the side
of the cart and said, "I ain't stopping for shit. Fuck you. You can't touch me."
(Tr., p. 169, Ls. 6-9.) Passons then drew a folding knife from his pocket, opened
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it and pointed it at the employees, then ran into the Walmart parking lot to his

car. (Tr., p. 169, Ls. 10-13; p.170, L. 21-p.171, L. 6; p.172, L. 23-p.173, L.
4; p. 208, L. 17 - p. 209, L. 17.) The employees alerted police about the incident
and provided Passons' vehicle's description, license plate number, and direction
of travel. (Tr., p. 173, Ls. 7-9.) The employees also sent out an alert about the
incident, including photos, to nearby Walmart stores, warning them to be on the
look-out for Passons and the stolen stroller. (Tr., p. 190, L. 13-p. 191, L. 4.)
The next day, Passons went to a Walmart in Ponderay, Idaho. (Tr., p.
217, L. 16 - p. 218, L. 25.)

Passons drove there with a woman and her

boyfriend, both of whom Passons met that day.

(Tr., p. 228, Ls. 3-15.)

In

exchange for a ride to the store, the woman attempted to return the stroller and a
set of Legos for Passons. (Tr., p. 227, L. 11 - p. 228, L. 25.) When Walmart did
not allow her to complete the return, they "left in a hurry and loaded it back in the
car." (Tr., p. 229, Ls. 17-24.)
The three hurried off, with Passons driving, to downtown Sandpoint. (Tr.,
p. 231, Ls. 8-13.) Police started following Passons' car, "one after the other" for
about 25 minutes until Passons hit a curb, deflating the front passenger tire.
(Tr., p. 231, Ls. 15-23; p. 244, Ls. 14-25.) Police arrested Passons. (R., p. 9.)
The state charged Passons with two counts of aggravated assault, and one
count of burglary. (R., pp. 54-56.) Passons proceeded to trial, and a jury found
him guilty of all three counts. (R., p. 273.) The district court entered judgment
and sentence, and Passons timely appealed. (R., pp. pp. 315-17, 321-24.)
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ISSUES
Passons states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing the State to
present evidence of Mr. Passons' actions the day after the charged
crime?

2.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Passons' motions for mistrial
as the jury hearing he was a repeat offender and a suspect in a
robbery deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

3.

Even if the errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Passons'
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law violated
because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his right to a
fair trial?

(Appellant's brief, p. 12.)

The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Passons failed to show the district court erred or abused its discretion
in allowing evidence of events leading up to his arrest the day after his
crimes were committed, and that tended to establish his motive, plan,
knowledge, and consciousness of guilt?

2.

Has Passons failed to show the district court erred or abused its discretion
in denying his motions for mistrial due to a prospective juror's statement
about Passons' tattoos during voir dire, and a witness's objected-to
statement at trial for which the district court promptly gave a curative
instruction?

3.

Has Passons failed to establish cumulative error that violated his right to a
fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

Passons Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion
In Allowing Evidence Of Events Leading Up To His Arrest The Day After His
Crimes Were Committed. And That Tended To Establish His Motive. Plan,
Knowledge, And Consciousness Of Guilt
A.

Introduction
Before trial, Passons asked the district court to exclude evidence under

Rule 404(b) of his efforts to return the stroller, and the ensuing police-chase, the
day after the charged crimes.

(Tr., pp. 114-19; see Augmentation (Notice of

Intent).) The district court denied Passons' request, allowing the evidence at
trial. (Tr., p. 136, Ls. 17-24; p. 138, Ls. 12-21.) Passons asserts on appeal that
the district court's ruling was in error and an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 13-20.) Passons' arguments fail because the evidence to which he
objected was admissible.
B.

Standard Of Review
Rulings under Rule 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard:

whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d
1185, 1187 (2009).
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C.

Evidence Of Events Leading Up To Passons' Arrest Was Relevant And
Admissible
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is

inadmissible to prove the character of the defendant in an attempt to show that
he or she committed the crime for which he or she stands trial. Grist, 147 Idaho
at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188.

Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible if (a) it is

relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and (b) its
probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by the
probability of unfair prejudice.

State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d

227, 230 (1999). The second prong of this test only excludes evidence if the
danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275-76, 77 P.3d 956, 964-65 (2003).
1.

Evidence Of Events Leading To Passons' Arrest Was Relevant
And Admissible As Part Of The Charged Crime

"Rule 404(b) does not prevent the introduction of other misconduct
evidence if the misconduct was so interconnected with the charged offense that
a complete account of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without
disclosure of the uncharged misconduct." State v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410,413, 49
P.3d 1260, 1263 (Ct. App. 2002). "All facts inseparably connected to the chain
of events of which the act charged in the information is a part are admissible
even though the full story shows the commission of other crimes." State v. Izatt,
96 Idaho 667, 670, 534 P.2d 1107, 1110 (1975) (quoted in Avila, 137 Idaho at
413, 49 P.3d at 1263).

These inseparable facts are "intrinsic evidence ...

inextricably intertwined" with the crime charged, such that both "are part of a
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single criminal episode." State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 228, 178 P.3d 28, 31
(2008) (quoting U.S. v. Sumlin, 489 F.3d 683, 689 (5th Cir. 2007) (other citations
omitted)); see also State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949, 277 P.3d 392, 396
(Ct. App. 2012). Accordingly, an intrinsic act "is not a prior crime, wrong, or other
act" under Rule 404(b).

&

It is instead "physical, circumstantial evidence."

kt

In Sheldon, the defendant's possession of $7,000 in cash was intrinsic evidence
of the charged crime - trafficking in methamphetamine.
was not 404(b) evidence."

&

Therefore, "the cash

&

In this case, the events leading up to Passons' arrest were circumstantial
evidence, inextricably intertwined with his charged crimes. Passons' attempt to
return the stolen stroller, flight from the Ponderay Walmart, and arrest in
Sandpoint, the day after his burglary at the Post Falls Walmart are part of a
single criminal episode, without which a complete account of the charged
offense could not be given. (See R., pp. 17-19; Tr., p. 226, L. 12 - p. 232, L. 5.)
Thus, Rule 404(b) is inapplicable and evidence of the events leading to Passons'
arrest was admissible as part of his crime.

2.

Evidence Of Events Leading To Passons' Arrest Was Relevant
And Admissible, Under Rule 404(b), To Passons' Motive, Plan,
Knowledge, And Consciousness Of Guilt

Even if the admission of the disputed evidence is controlled by Rule
404(b), Passons has failed to show error.

As to the first prong under Rule

404(b), evidence is admissible if relevant to show "proof of motive, ... intent, ...
plan, [or] knowledge." 1.R.E. 404(b); see also State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178,
845 P.2d 1211 (1993); State v. Gauna, 117 Idaho 83, 87, 785 P.2d 647, 651 (Ct.
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App. 1989). Whether the evidence is relevant is a legal issue reviewed de nova.
State v. Brummett, 150 Idaho 339, 342, 247 P.3d 204, 207 (Ct. App. 2010);
Sheldon, 145 Idaho at 228, 178 P.3d at 31.

The facts of Passons' case are

comparable to those in Brummett, in which the defendant was charged with
burglary at a Shopko, and the state presented evidence Brummett had
committed prior thefts from other Shopko stores. Brummett, 150 Idaho at 342,
247 P.3d at 207.
"Burglary is defined as entry into a store with intent to commit any theft or
any felony."

Brummett, 150 Idaho at 342, 247 P.3d at 207 (citing I.C. § 18-

1401 ). In Brummett, the Court noted, "[t]he state had the burden of proving that
Brummett intended to steal when he entered the store," and concluded,
"Brummett put the question of his intent upon entering the store squarely at
issue."

kl at 343,

247 P.3d at 208. The Court held, "[t]he Rule 404(b) evidence

was relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other
than propensity."

kl

Here, Passons' theft of the stroller was evidence of burglary because it
showed his intent to commit theft of the television when he re-entered the
Walmart immediately after stealing the stroller. (Tr., p. 271, Ls. 12-24.) Also,
Passons' attempt the following day to return the stroller for store credit was
relevant to his motive or plan, per Rule 404(b). (See Tr., p. 162, L. 16 - p. 163,
L. 3.) Passons' effort to return the stroller supports that he had a motive or plan,
upon re-entering the Post Falls Walmart, to steal high-value items and return
them for store credit.
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Passons' flight from police after leaving the Ponderay Walmart was also
relevant under Rule 404(b).

"Rule 404(b) allows evidence of other acts if

admitted for the purpose of showing knowledge or consciousness of guilt." State
v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State
v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 279, 77 P.3d 956, 968 (2003)). Idaho courts have
found evidence "of flight [or] escape" admissible to show consciousness of guilt.

.!sL

(citations omitted). Passons' flight from police, which ended when he blew-

out his front passenger tire, forcing him to stop, demonstrates his consciousness
of guilt, both for his actions that day and the day before. Accordingly, Passons'
actions fleeing from police were also relevant under Rule 404(b). See Pokorney,
149 Idaho at 463, 235 P.3d at 413.

3.

Passons Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its
Discretion In Balancing The Probative Value Of The Disputed
Evidence Against Its Prejudicial Effect

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury." I.R.E. 402. The district court's weighing of the
evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187.

In reviewing a district

court's discretionary decision for abuse, the appellate court considers whether
the court below (1) understood its decision was discretionary, (2) acted within the
scope of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and (3)
exercised reason in reaching its decision. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,
363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (citation omitted).
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Passons has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion.
As already discussed, the district court's ruling was consistent with applicable
law. Before announcing its ruling, the district court heard argument from both
parties and took a recess to review the applicable law. (Tr., pp. 114-138.) The
district court engaged in a Rule 404(b) analysis and excluded evidence of drug
paraphernalia, but allowed the evidence at issue here. (Tr., p. 133, L. 12 - p.
138, L. 24.) The record demonstrates the district court was aware its decision
was discretionary, and that it exercised reason in rendering its ruling.
Accordingly, Passons has not shown the district court erred or abused its
discretion in allowing the challenged evidence.

11.
Passons Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred Or Abused Its Discretion
In Denying His Motions For Mistrial
A.

Introduction
Passons argues he was denied his right to a fair trial due to two events at

trial. The first was a prospective juror's comment about Passons' tattoos during
voir dire.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-27.)

The second was a police officer's

statement during her testimony, to which counsel objected and for which the
district court gave a curative instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.) Under
the applicable standard of review, and in light of the entire record, Passons
cannot meet his burden of showing error, let alone reversible error.
B.

Standard Of Review
The issue on review of a district court's ruling denying a motion for mistrial

"is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion in light of the
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circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made." State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 68, 253 P.3d 727, 742 (2011) (quoting State v. Field, 144 Idaho
559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007); State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, _,
297 P.3d 257, 263 (Ct. App. 2013). Rather, the question is "whether the event
which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when
viewed in the context of the full record."

19.:.

(citations omitted). The focus of

appellate review "is upon the ultimate impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion."

19.:.

"The trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial

will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error."

19.:.

"Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial."

State v. Gutierrez, 143

Idaho 289, 293, 141 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Urquhart,
105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). The event triggering a
mistrial motion must be both prejudicial and deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
to warrant a mistrial. I.C.R. 29.1 (a). Also, an error is harmless if the reviewing
court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached
the same result absent the error.
C.

19.:.

The Prospective Juror's Statement About Passons' Tattoos During Voir
Dire Did Not Amount To Reversible Error
In this case, a prospective juror told the trial judge during voir dire,
... this is kind of embarrassing to say, but if he's a defendant, I
work in a bar. He's already covered in tattoos. He's been in and
out of jail more than I can count. Those aren't normal tattoos that
people just get for decoration. I've already formed an opinion of
him. I honestly don't think I can give him a fair trial.
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(Tr., p. 19, L. 21 - p. 20, L. 2.) The trial judge responded, "Well, I don't know
that I agree with your conclusions, but that's not important. ... " (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 34.)

The prospective juror continued, "I know about the difference between

decorative and -" and the trial judge interjected, saying, "That's quite all right.
Thank you very much . . .. Why don't you go ahead and step down and I will
excuse you." (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 6-10.) Defense counsel requested an immediate
sidebar at which he moved for a mistrial. (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 11-13; p. 76, Ls. 11-14.)
Passons argues the prospective juror's comment deprived him of a fair trial.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 24-27.) However, Passons' argument is unsupported by
the record or applicable law.
"A juror is presumed to be impartial," and "even a juror's expression of his
own opinion of the case during voir dire does not render him partial." Ellington,
151 Idaho at 69,253 P.3d at 743. In Ellington, three prospective jurors- none of
whom ultimately sat on the jury - expressed opinions during voir dire that they
believed the defendant was guilty.

lfi at 68-69,

253 P.3d at 742-43. The Court

in that case noted, "At worst, the jurors who actually deliberated received a
second-hand opinion from those three prospective jurors . . .. They did not
receive any specific facts as to why, other than that the prospective jurors read
about it in the paper and in one instance interacted with a member of the
[victim's] family."

Id.

The Court continued, "The impaneled jurors were

instructed at the end of voir dire that they were to decide the case only based on
the evidence presented in the courtroom," and they "were again instructed of this
duty before their deliberations."

lfi
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In State v. Laymon, a prospective juror said during voir dire, "Well, I think
he's guilty already." 140 Idaho 768, 769, 101 P.3d 712, 713 (Ct. App. 2004).
The trial court gave a curative instruction including that "each person is
presumed innocent unless and until they are found guilty by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."

kl

The trial court denied Laymen's motion for a mistrial.

kl

at 770, 101 P.3d at 714. On appeal, the Court noted, "there is no evidence that
the jury here did not follow the trial court's instructions. The potential juror who
uttered the statements at issue was removed, and there is no evidence that her
statements had but a passing, inconsequential effect on the remaining pool
members."

19.:. at 771,

101 P.3d at 715. The Court concluded, "Laymon was not

deprived of a fair trial because of the potential juror's statements," adding,
"Indeed, the purpose of voir dire is to discover which, if any, of the potential
jurors are unable to meet the demands such service requires."

kl

"[T]he

potential juror identified herself as unable to serve [and] was thereafter removed
. . .. Because there was no continuing impact on the trial, the district court did
not err in denying Laymon's motion for mistrial."

kl

The holdings in Ellington and Laymon apply here. All jurors selected to
serve on Passons' jury were questioned by the court and counsel about their
ability to be impartial. (Tr., pp. 13-67.) The district court instructed the jury at the
start of trial, 'The law requires that your decision be made solely upon the
evidence before you.

Neither sympathy nor prejudice should influence you in

your deliberations." (Tr., p. 149, Ls. 19-21.) The district court further instructed,
"In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this
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trial," which consists of "the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and
received, and any stipulated or admitted facts." (Tr., p. 149, L. 24 - p. 150, L. 3.)
At the end of trial the district court again told the jury, "You are to decide the
facts from all the evidence presented in the case," which consists of the
witnesses' testimony, exhibits admitted into evidence, and facts stipulated by the
parties. (Tr., p. 265, Ls. 5-11.)
The prospective juror here claimed a generalized knowledge of nondecorative tattoos, based on her work "in a bar." (Tr., p. 19, L. 22 - p. 20, L. 7.)
The prospective juror did not purport to know Passons or anything about
Passons personally. Thus, the disputed comments here were of less concern
than those in Ellington, which were based on information pertaining to Ellington's
case. 151 Idaho at 68-69, 253 P.3d at 742-43. As in Laymon, the prospective
juror here was unable to meet the demands of service on the jury and was
excused. 140 Idaho at 771, 101 P.3d at 715.
Jurors are presumed to be impartial and to carry out their sworn duty to
apply the law to the facts borne out at trial. Ellington, 151 Idaho at 69, 253 P.3d
at 743.

Jurors are also presumed to follow the instructions given by the trial

court. State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544, 285 P.3d 348, 359 (Ct. App. 2012).
Accordingly, it is presumed that the jurors here followed the trial court's
instruction regarding what evidence the jury should consider. Although the trial
court did not immediately instruct prospective jurors to disregard the disputed
comment, the record does not support that the defense requested a curative
instruction or that doing so would have better addressed Passons' concern; an
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instruction immediately after the comment would potentially have drawn undue
attention to it. See Laymon, 140 Idaho at 771, 101 P.3d at 715 (although the
Court on appeal found no error, Laymon argued the trial court's curative
instruction about charges dismissed prior to trial "served only to reinforce the
potential juror's statements.") To the extent any jurors heard or considered the
disputed comment at the time it was made (during voir dire), the trial court's
general instructions addressed the comment.
Passons has failed to demonstrate the prospective juror's statement had
a continuing impact on his trial.

Accordingly, this Court should reject his

arguments, concerning the disputed statements during voir dire, that the motion
for mistrial was erroneously denied.

D.

The Police Officer's Statement At Trial To Which Defense Counsel
Objected And For Which The District Court Promptly Gave A Curative
Instruction, Was Not Reversible Error, But Was Instead Harmless
The prosecution's final witness was the police officer who arrested

Passons. (Tr., pp. 233-50.) To avoid eliciting hearsay, the prosecution asked
the officer to "describe what was going on rather than what someone said. What
was going on during the pursuit?" (Tr., p. 234, Ls. 14-18.) The officer started to
respond, "We were following a suspect from a robbery that occurred -" at which
point defense counsel objected. (Tr., p. 234, Ls. 19-22.) After hearing argument
from counsel, the trial court gave the following curative instruction to the jury:
I want to instruct you that there was no robbery. There has been
no robbery charged, nor is Mr. Passons a suspect in a robbery at
the relevant time in question here. So I just want to make sure the
jury is very well aware of that.
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(Tr., p. 242, Ls. 3-7.)

Passons asserts the officer's statement that she was

following a suspect from a "robbery" was reversible error that deprived him of a
(Appellant's brief, pp. 25-27.)

fair trial.

Again, Passons' argument is

unsupported by the facts or applicable law.
As already discussed, the jury is presumed to follow the trial court's
instructions.

Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 544, 285 P.3d 348, 359. The curative

instruction here very plainly addressed the officer's statement.

Although

Passons asserts he was "denied his right to have jurors consider only relevant
and competent evidence bearing on his guilt or innocence," he identifies nothing
in the record indicating that the jury considered anything but the relevant and
competent evidence before it in rendering its verdict.

That Passons was a

"suspect" in a "robbery" is hardly surprising or prejudicial given that the evidence
showed he pulled a knife and threatened store employees in the course of a
burglary. Absent any valid factual or legal support, Passons has failed to show
the jury disregarded the curative instruction.

Passons has therefore failed to

show that the officer's statement had any impact on the outcome of his trial.
Accordingly, this Court must reject Passons' argument.

E.

The Record As A Whole Supports The Trial Court's Ruling Denying
Passons' Motion For Mistrial
Taking the record as a whole, and in light of applicable law, there is no

support for Passons' argument that a mistrial was warranted. Passons has cited
no evidence that any member of his jury was biased. (See Appellant's brief, pp.
24-27.)

Indeed, Passons acknowledges he "does not assert that he was

deprived his right to an impartial jury based solely on [the prospective juror's]
15

comments."

(Appellant's brief, p. 26.)

Instead, he argues that the jury -

although impartial - considered improper and inadmissible statements, thus
depriving him of a fair trial. (Appellant's brief, pp. 26-27.) This argument ignores
the firmly-established presumption that the jury followed the trial court's
instructions to only consider the evidence before it, not stricken evidence or
statements (such as that by the prospective juror) that are not evidence. See
Thumm, 153 Idaho at 544, 285 P.3d at 359.
There is no basis to conclude that the disputed comments during voir dire
and by the state's witness at trial were considered by the jury or otherwise
affected the outcome of Passons' trial. Passons has thus failed to demonstrate
prejudice, and failed to show reversible error. Moreover, Passons has failed to
articulate a valid argument that he was denied a fair trial. Accordingly, this Court
should reject Passons' arguments that his motions for mistrial were improperly
denied.
111.
Passons Has Failed To Establish That An Accumulation Of Errors Violated His
Right To A Fair Trial
"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when
there is an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be
harmless, but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and
alteration omitted). A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 230,
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245 P.3d 961, 982 (201 O); State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct.
App. 1998).

Passons asserts that "the accumulation of errors in this case

deprived him of his right to a fair trial."

(Appellant's brief, p. 28.)

However,

Passons has failed to show any error, let alone two or more errors. Thus, the
doctrine of cumulative error does not apply.

See, ~ . LaBelle v. State, 130

Idaho 115,121,937 P.2d 427,433 (Ct. App. 1997).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Passons' judgment
of conviction.
DATED this 5th day of June, 2014.
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